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INTRODUCTION
From now on, every State in the country will be required by law to
tell a community when a dangerous sexual predator enters its
midst. We respect people's rights, but today America proclaims
there is no greater right than a parent's right to raise a child in
safety and love. Today, America warns: If you dare to prey on our
children, the law will follow you wherever you go. State to State,
town to town.
Today, America circles the wagon around our children.1
Now, [registration] has caused me more problems than going to
prison. I was evicted from my mother's apartment; left me virtually
homeless.... I've been on television. I've been in [the] Overland
Park [newspaper] ... every Friday.
I can't live like this and every morning I get up to look at the pa-
per-I'm paranoid. I can't take this. I'm about ready to crack,
okay? ... At least in prison I knew I had a place to sleep. I would
rather go back to prison. I can't do this.2
Few crimes spark as strong or distinctive an aversion as sexual of-
fenses against children.3 As a society, we seem united in our categori-
zation of these acts as among the most heinous. Those who commit
such offenses are outcasts, perverts, or animals, not worthy of the ba-
sic human rights our Constitution guarantees. Although this state-
ment seems like an exaggeration, numerous laws prevent this very
class of persons, who have been tried, convicted, incarcerated and re-
leased from our prison system, from enjoying many of the civil liber-
ties we take for granted. These laws, known as sex offender registra-
1. President William Jefferson Clinton, Remarks at Signing Ceremony for Megan's Law
(May 17, 1996), available in LEXIS, Codes Library, Presdc File [hereinafter Clinton's Remarks].
2. State v. Myers, 923 P.2d 1024, 1028 (Kan. 1996) (statement of appellant Kym Myers)
(alteration in original), cert. deni4d, 117 S. Ct. 2508 (1997).
3. See ADAM SAMPSON, ACrs OF ABUSE: SEX OFFENDERS AND THE CRIMINALJUSTICE SYSTEM
124 (1994) ("The vehemence of hatred for sex offenders is unmatched by attitudes to any
other offenders.").
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tion and notification statutes, are common to every state.5 Passed in
an effort to combat the alleged epidemic of sex crimes against chil-
dren,6 these laws collectively have stretched the constitutional limits
ofjustice to a dangerous extreme. In addition, they have opened the
door to so-called "crime prevention measures" that were once con-
sidered unthinkable.7
This Comment will consider the ongoing public debate surround-
ing registration and notification laws. Part I traces the development
of these laws on a national level, and examines the different re-
quirements states have imposed on convicted sex offenders. Part II
discusses the various constitutional challenges raised in the courts
concerning registration and notification. Next, Part III responds to
the policy arguments on which proponents of these measures rely.
Part IV argues that notification laws are not only ineffective, but have
prompted the adoption of even more intrusive crime prevention tac-
tics. Finally, Part V offers alternatives to current notification laws that
better address the goals of prevention and rehabilitation.
I. HISTORY OF REGISTRATION AND NOTIFICATION STATUTES
A. Development
For many, the explosion of registration and notification laws can
8be traced to the death of seven-year-old Megan Kanka. In 1994, Me-
gan was brutally raped and murdered by a neighbor, Jesse Tim-
4. Registration laws typically require that, upon release from prison, a convicted sex of-
fender register certain personal information with local law enforcement agencies so that
authorities may know of his whereabouts. Notification laws take this action a step further by
allowing those authorities to release some or all the information to selected members of the
public. For examples of these statutes, see infra Part I.B.
5. See infra notes 14-15 and accompanying text.
6. Many states enacted their statutes in response to public outrage to notorious crimes.
For example, NewJersey enacted N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:7-1 to :7-5 after a previously convicted sex
offender raped and murdered Megan Kanka. See Ryan A. Boland, Note, Sex Offender Registration
and Community Notifcation: Protection, Not Punishment, 30 NEW ENG. L. REv. 183, 183-85 (1995)
(discussing events leading to enactment of NewJersey's sex offender law). Illinois enacted the
Sex Offender Registration Act in response to the 1995 murder of Christopher Meyer. SeeJes-
sica R. Ball, Comment, Public Disclosure of "America's Secret Shame": Child Sex Offender Community
Notification in Illinois, 27 LOy. U. CHI. LJ. 401, 402 (1996) (discussing circumstances that led to
passage of Illinois' sex offender statute). Ironically, Meyer's assailant had a previous conviction
for murder unrelated to any sexual offense. Thus, he would not have been subject to notifica-
tion even had such a law existed. See id. at 403.
7. See infra notes 206-19 and accompanying text (noting radical treatment programs
adopted by several states as component of notification statutes).
8. So strong is the connection that registration and notification laws of all states are col-
lectively referred to as "Megan's Laws." SeeJoe Holleman, Case Highlights Sex-OffenderDebat4 ST.
Louis POST-DISPATCH,June 6, 1996, at Al. When President Clinton urged support for a federal
version of these laws, he specifically mentioned Megan's name. SeeJoseph F. Sullivan, Whitman
Approves Stringent Restrictions on Sex Criminals, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 1, 1994, at BI.
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mendequas, who, unknown to Megan's parents or the community,
had twice been convicted of sexual assaults. 9 Within months of this
horrific crime, the NewJersey legislature passed what has been called
"the most comprehensive and stringent" of all sex offender statutes.' °
Although the New Jersey sex offender statute was not the first such
U.S. law," it has become a model for similar statutes around the
country2 in spite of prominent constitutional challenges. 3 Today, all
fifty states have registration statutes, 4 with an increasing number add-
9. See Robert Hanley, Federal Appeals Court Rejects a Challenge to "Megan's Law, "N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 13, 1996, at A23.
10. See Boland, supra note 6, at 193-96 (describing NewJersey's notification provisions).
11. See, e.g., ARiz. ADMIN. CODE 43-6117 (1939 & Supp. 1952); CAL. PENAL CODE § 290
(West 1947). Both of these statutes required registration of released sex offenders. In 1990,
Washington became the first state to add a notification component. SeeWASH. REV. CODEANN.
§§ 4.24.550, 9A.44.130 (West 1995 & Supp. 1997).
12. See N.Y. CoRREcr. LAw § 168(a)-(v) (McKinney Supp. 1997).
13. See Doe v. Poritz, 662 A.2d 367 (NJ. 1995) (rejecting ex post facto, cruel and unusual
punishment, and equal protection claims); see also Artway v. Attorney Gen., 81 F.3d 1235 (3d
Cir. 1996) (upholding New Jersey's registration component, but suggesting that notification
provisions may be unconstitutional). Although the nationwide push towards adoption of simi-
lar statutes has not abated, some states have been more careful in framing their legislation as a
result of these challenges. The Massachusetts legislature, for example, submitted proposed bill
S.B. 2276 to the state Supreme Judicial Court in an attempt to weed out constitutional infirmi-
ties before its passage. See Opinion of the Justices of the Senate, No. SJC-07224, 1996 WL
4062308 (Mass.July 18, 1996).
14. SeeALA. CODE § 13A-11-200 (1994);ALASKASTAT. §§ 12.63.010-.100, 18.65.087 (Michie
1996); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 1-3821 to -3824, 41-1750(B) (West Supp. 1996);ARK. CODE
ANN. § 12-12-901 to -909 (Michie 1995); CAL. PENAL CODE § 290-290.7 (West Supp. 1997);
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-3-412.5 (Supp. 1996); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 54-102r (Supp. 1997);
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4120 (1995 & Supp. 1996); FLA. STAT. ch. 775.21 (Harrison Supp.
1996); GA. CODE ANN. § 42-1-12 (1997); HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 707 to 743 (Michie Supp. 1996)
(repealed 1997); IDAHO CODE § 18-8301 to -8311 (1997); 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. 150/1 to /10.9
(West 1992 & Supp. 1997); IND. CODE ANN. § 5-2-12-1 to -13 (Michie Supp. 1997); IOwA CODE
ANN. § 692a.1 to .13 (West Supp. 1997); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 224902 to -4910 (1995 & Supp.
1996); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 17.500 to .540 (Banks-Baldwin 1995); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15:540
to :549 (West Supp. 1997); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 34-A, §§ 11101-11144 (West Supp. 1996);
MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 792B (1996 & Supp. 1997);MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 6, § 178(c)-(o) (Law
Co-op. 1996); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 4.475(1)-(12) (Law Co-op. 1997); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 243.166 (West Supp. 1997); MISS. CODE ANN. § 45-33-1 to -19 (Supp. 1997); Mo. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 566-600 to -625 (West Supp. 1997); MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-23-501 to -508 (1995); NEB.
REV. STAT. § 29-4001 to -4013 (Supp. 1996); NEV. REV. STAT. § 207.151 to .157 (1995); N.H.
REV. STAT. § 651-B:1 to -B:9 (Supp. 1996); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:7-1 to :7-11 (West 1995 & Supp.
1997); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 29-11-A-1 to -11-8 (Michie 1997); N.Y. CORREC. LAW § 168 to 168-v
(McKinney Supp. 1997); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-208.5 to .13 (Supp. 1996); N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 12.1-32-15 (Supp. 1997); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2950.01 to .99 (Anderson 1996 & Supp.
1996); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 57, §§ 581-587 (West 1991 & Supp. 1997); OR. REv. STAT. § 181.594
to .602 (1995); 42 PA.-CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 9791-9799.6 (West Supp. 1997); RI. GEN. LAWS
§ 11-37.1-1 to -19 (1994 & Supp. 1996); S.C. CODE ANN. § 23-3-400 to -490 (Law Co-op. Supp.
1996); S.D. CODIFIED LAws § 22-22-31 to -39 (Michie Supp. 1997); TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-39-
101 to -108 (Supp. 1996); TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-13c.1 (West Supp. 1997);UTAH
CODE ANN. § 77-27-21.5 (1995 & Supp. 1997); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, §§ 5401-5413 (1996); VA.
CODEANN. §§ .19.2-298.1 to -298.4, 19.2-390.1 (Michie 1995 & Supp. 1997);WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. § 9A.44.130-.140 (West Supp. 1997); W. VA. CODE § 61-SF-1 to -10 (1997);Wis. STAT. ANN.
§ 175.45 (West Supp. 1997); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 7-19-301 to -306 (Michie 1995).
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ing notification provisions.' 5
If Megan Kanka's death and the New Jersey statute lit the spark,
then the federal government since has fanned the flames. In 1994,
Congress enacted The Jacob Wetterling Crimes Against Children and
Sexually Violent Offender Registration Act (the "Act")'6 as a provi-
sion of the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act.17 Two
years later, Congress amended the Act to include a notification provi-
sion,'8 instructing local authorities to release "relevant information
that is necessary to protect the public."' 9 Although the Act's guide-
lines are vague, its impact is not: the federal statute penalizes states
that fail to enact registration and notification laws through reduction
of their federal funding.2° The march towards national notification is
well under way.
B. Nature of Registration and Notification Laws
Although the flexibility of the Jacob Wetterling Act has led to di-
versity among the various state registration and notification statutes,
some common elements are apparent. Typically, registration laws
15. The following states also include some form of notification provision: Alaska, Arizona,
California, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, Maine,
Montana, Nevada, NewJersey, North Carolina, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylva-
nia, South Dakota, Tennessee, Virginia, and Washington. See supra note 14 for specific statutes.
16. Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 2038 (1994) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1407 (Supp. I
1995)). Jacob Wetterling, an eleven-year-old boy who was abducted at gunpoint in 1989 from a
Minnesota convenience store, has never been found. See Brief for Appellee at 147, Doe v.
Poritz, 662 A.2d 367 (N.J. 1995) (No. 39,989).
17. Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 2038 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 13701-14223). The law
requires in part that any person "convicted of a criminal offense against a victim who is a minor
or who is convicted of a sexually violent offense" to register with their state authorities. See 42
U.S.C. §§ 14701(a) (1) (A), (f)(2). Criminal offense includes"criminal sexual conduct toward
a minor," conduct "that by its nature is a sexual offense toward a minor," kidnapping (except
by a parent), and solicitation of sexual conduct or prostitution. See id. § 14071 (a) (3) (A). Sex-
ual offense means "any criminal offense that consists of aggravated sexual abuse or sexual
abuse" under state or federal law, or the intent, through physical contact, to commit such
abuse. See id. § 14071(a) (3) (B). Those affected must register for ten years. See id.
§ 14071(a) (1) (A), (b) (6) (A). If a court determines that the offender suffers from a mental
abnormality, the registration period may be extended. See id. § 14071 (a) (2), (a) (3) (B)-(C).
18. SeeThe Jacob Wetterling Crimes Against Children & Sexually Violent Offender Regis-
tration Program, Pub. L. No. 104-145, 110 Stat. 1345 (1996) (codified as amended 42 U.S.C.A.
§ 14071 (d) (3) (Supp. 1997)). Some have speculated that the notification stipulation was
added in response to Megan Kanka's death. See Michelle PiaJerusalem, Note, A Frameworkfor
Post-Sentence Sex Offender Legislation: Perspectives on Prevention, Registration, and the Public's "Right"
to Know, 48 VAND. L. REv. 219, 223 n.21 (1995) (noting that the original House bill contained
no notification provision).
19. The Jacob Wetterling Crimes Against Children & Sexually Violent Offender Registra-
tion Program, § 2. The law intended to set only a minimum standard, allowing states to widen
the scope of notification as desired. See 140 CONG. REc. S12,531 (daily ed. Aug. 25, 1994)
(statement of Sen. Gorton).
20. Se 42 U.S.C. § 14071(f). States had until September 13, 1997, to meet this require-
ment. See id. The funds so conditioned are those provided under 42 U.S.C. § 3756 for the
purpose of aiding local law enforcement.
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require a sex offender to provide local law enforcement officers with
his" name, local address, nature of offense, photograph, fingerprints,
and dates of incarceration.H Other states require that offenders give
notice to local authorities of any intention to move.r Still others ap-
ply only to repeat offenders24 or to those who target children.2s The
requirement may last anywhere from a few years to a lifetime,2 al-
though some states allow offenders to petition the court for release
of this duty.27 The general purpose of these laws is to provide police
with enough information to locate the offender if a crime in his area
211of residence occurs.
Notification laws offer even greater variety in terms of who is
subject to notification, the scope of that notification, and the manner
in which this process is carried out. In certain states, the level of re-
quired notification depends on the perceived risk that the offender
presents to the public.2 New Jersey, for example, evaluates a sex of-
21. This Comment will refer to offenders with male pronouns because most sexual perpe-
trators are men. See GORDON C. NAGAYAMA HALL, THEORY BASED ASSESSMENT, TREATMENTAND
PREVENTION OF SEXUAL AGGRESSION 11 (1992) (stating that males constitute vast majority of
sexual aggression perpetrators); see alsojerusalem, supra note 18, at 221 (citing Department of
Justice Report estimating that female sexual aggressors accounted for less than 10% of sexual
offenses in 1992).
22. See Boland, supra note 6, at 190 (describing information offender must usually provide
under registration laws). Some states have added to this base of information in unique ways.
Connecticut, for example, requires sex offenders to provide a blood sample that can be used in
creation of a DNA data bank. See Rachel Gottleib, Parents'Anxiety Refuels Legal Debate. Right to
Privacy vs. Community Safety with Molester Living in Burlington, HARTFORD COURANT, Sept. 6, 1996,
at A3 (discussing debate over specific provisions in sex offender and notification law). Califor-
nia obtains blood and saliva samples of offenders for the same purpose. See CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 290-290.7 (Supp. 1997). NewJersey reserves the right to request any information that the
Attorney General finds necessary. See NJ. STAT. ANN. § 2C:7-1 to :7-11 (West 1995 & Supp.
1997). That discretionary information comes in addition to a laundry list of statistics, including
the registrant's name, sex, age, date of birth, physical description, Social Security number, ad-
dress, employment information, date and place of each adjudication, convictions or acquittals,
and fingerprints. See id.
23. See, e.g., NEV. REV. STAT. § 207.151 to .157 (1995); NJ. STAT. ANN. § 2C:7-1 to :7-11.
24. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 12-12-902 (Michie 1995); 730 ILL. COMP. ANN. STAT. 150/2
(West Supp. 1997).
25. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 12-12-902; COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-3-412.5 (Supp. 1996);
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 243.166 (West 1992 & Supp. 1997).
26. For example, Minnesota, Arkansas, Illinois, and Ohio have a ten-year requirement;
Maine and Virginia impose a fifteen year requirement; Alabama, Arizona, California, Delaware,
and Florida require offenders to provide government officers with this information for the du-
ration of their lives. See supra note 14 (identifying state statutes).
27. For examples, see the Arkansas, California, Colorado, and Maine state statutes, cited
supra note 14. The process, however, may be difficult. See infra notes 189-93 and accompany-
ing text (describing typical appeal procedure).
28. The data is intended to provide police with "a ready list of suspects when investigating
sex crimes." Holleman, supra note 8, at Al. Some critics have objected to the "wide net" cre-
ated by registration. See Sex Offenses, 51 U.S.L.W. 2739, 2739 (U.S.June 14, 1983) (stating that,
if successful, registration "presumably means a series of command performance at lineups")
(internal citation omitted).
29. See State v. Myers, 923 P.2d 1024, 1036 (Kan. 1996) (discussing trends in the develop-
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fender according to his level of risk,"0 and places him in one of three
categories." The resulting category dictates who within the commu-
nity local officials will notify. 2 Some states restrict the recipients of
information to organizations dealing with children.33 Other states
simply allow officials to release information to whomever they deem
appropriate when necessary for the protection of the public.3
Although a number of states will provide information from a cen-
tral registry on special request,s 5 some states have developed more
unique methods for delivering information to the public. In Califor-
nia, for example, citizens can access information about specific indi-
viduals through use of a "900" number.36 Louisiana puts the burden
ment of state registration laws), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 2508 (1997). For examples of statutes
following this approach to notification, see CONN. GEN. STAT. § 54-102r (Supp. 1997); NJ.
STAT. ANN. § 2C:7-1 to :7-11 (West 1995 & Supp. 1997); N.Y. CoRRECr. LAW § 168 to 168v
(McKinney Supp. 1997).
30. Some of the risk factors include: the degree of force and contact with the victim, the
age of the victim and manner in which he or she was selected, the number of offenses commit-
ted, the time elapsed since the last offense, and the degree of residential support and employ-
ment or educational stability available to the offender. See Artway v. Attorney Gen., 81 F.3d
1235, 1244 n.2 (3d Cir. 1996) (citing the "Registrant Risk Assessment Scale" published by the
NJ. Attorney General). The prosecutor will attach a risk level of low, moderate, or high to
each of these factors, and evaluate the offender accordingly. The offender's score is then tabu-
lated, and a risk category assigned. The prosecutor may adjust his findings based on other fac-
tors, such as the offender's admission that he will strike again, or the presence of any physical
disability that would render the offender relatively harmless. See id.
31. Tier One notification is for low risk offenders; only local law enforcement agencies will
be notified. Tier Two is for moderate risk offenders, involving notification of local community
groups, schools, and religious and youth organizations. Tier Three is for high-risk offenders,
with notification directed to reach any "members of the public likely to encounter the person
registered...." NJ. STAT. ANN. § 2C:7-8(c)(1)-(3); see also N.Y. CORRECr. LAW § 168-1
(McKinney Supp. 1997) (modeled after NewJersey's tier notification system).
32. See NJ. STAT. ANN. § 2C:7-8(c) (1)-(3). Although NewJersey asserts three levels of noti-
fication, critics and commentators alike have called its provisions mandatory, because even at
the lowest level some information is released. See Boland, supra note 6, at 195 (maintaining
that notification in NewJersey is mandatory because "all registrants will be subject at the very
least to Tier One Notification").
33. See IND. CODE ANN. § 5-2-12-11 (Michie Supp. 1997) (providing information to "all
school corporations, non-public schools, child care facilities, and state agencies licensed to
work with children"); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 57, § 584E (West Supp. 1997) (law enforcement
"shall make its sex offender registry available" to schools, child care agencies, and state agen-
cies servicing children).
34. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15:540 to :549 (West Supp. 1997) (authorizing release of in-
formation "when ... necessary for public protection"); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 16, § 615 (West
1983) (stating that "information may be disseminated to any person for any purpose"); TENN.
CODE ANN. §§ 40-39-101 to -108 (Supp. 1996) ("[A] ... law enforcement agency shall release
relevant information deemed necessary to protect the public .... .");WAsH. REV. CODE ANN. §§
4.24.550, 9A.44.130 to .140 (West Supp. 1997) (allowing officials"to release relevant and neces-
sary information regarding sex offenders to the public when necessary for public protection").
35. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 290-290.7 (Supp. 1997) (allowing public access to habitual
sex offender subdirectory); IND. CODE ANN. § 5-2-12-11 (providing information from a central
registry to schools and other child care facilities on computer disk);N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-208.5
to -208.13 (Supp. 1996) (providing information from central registry upon specific request).
36. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 290.4. Callers must identify the complete name of the sus-
pected offender. See id. If a match is found, they can receive information regarding the of-
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directly on the offender, requiring him to send postcards, at his own
expense, to neighbors announcing his status. Oregon simplifies the
process still further by requiring the registrant to place a notice in his
window stating "Sex Offender Residence." 3 Although analogous tac-
tics have been directed at other offenders, 9 measures such as these sit
at the heart of the controversy surrounding registration and notifica-
tion laws.
II. CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES
Following the judicial tradition of legislative deference, courts pre-
sume that statutes are constitutional; the burden rests on the parties
seeking invalidation to prove otherwise.4 Although there have been
numerous challenges to registration and notification laws throughout
the country,41 the Supreme Court has yet to hear a case on this issue.'
A review of the various lower court decisions illustrates the need for
uniform settlement of the issues raised by these laws.
A. Ex Post Facto
The United States Constitution prohibits the federal government
fender's physical description, residence, and the nature of the crime for which he was con-
victed. See id. One journalist suggested that California adopt the number1'-900-PERVERT."
See Debra J. Saunders, The Public's Right to Know, SAN. FRAN. CHRON., Apr. 6, 1994, at A17. A
federal district court recently enjoined New York from implementing its own "900" service. See
Kate Stone Lombardi, Sex-Felon Rights and Notification Face Legal Snag, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 17, 1996,
atWC13.
37. See LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 15:540 to :549. The cards identify the registrant's name, ad-
dress, and nature of their offense. See id. § 15.542(B) (1). Additional measures, such as bumper
stickers, signs, or labels on clothing may also be required at the parole board's discretion. See
id. § 15.542(B) (3).
38. See Holleman, supra note 8, atAl (discussing state methods of notification).
39. See generally Goldschmitt v. State, 490 So. 2d 123 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986) (upholding
requirement that Florida drunk driver place bumper sticker announcing his conviction on his
car). These measures, known as "Scarlet Letter" laws, are gaining momentum throughout the
country, and courts are applying them to a variety of crimes. One prominent Houston judge
regularly uses shame punishment, requiring offenders to apologize publicly through the media
for such crimes as wife beating, petty theft or welfare fraud. See 20/20 (ABC television broad-
cast, Oct. 18, 1996). In addition, a California court sentenced a woman convicted of burglary
to wear a T-shirt for an entire year announcing her crime. See id. For further discussion of the
history and modern justification of Scarlet Letter laws, see Jerusalem, supra note 18, at 223-31
(recounting the legal history of sex offender registration laws).
40. See Diversified Inv. Partnership v. Department of Soc. Health & Servs., 775 P.2d 947,
953 (Wash. 1989) (en banc) (finding that the plaintiff failed to meet burden of proving that
state legislature unconstitutionally delegated powers to the federal government). Those chal-
lenging a law must demonstrate that the law is constitutionally impermissible beyond a reason-
able doubt. See id.
41. See infra Part H.A-B (discussing constitutional challenges to registration and notifica-
tion laws).
42. The Court recently denied review of NewJersey's notification laws. See Doe v. Poritz,
516 U.S. 986 (1995).
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or any state from enacting ex post facto legislation.4 Several states,
however, have chosen to apply their sex offender laws retroactively,"
giving rise to numerous ex post facto challenges in state and federal
courts. 5 Generally, for a law to withstand ex post facto analysis, two
conditions must be met. First, the law must be non-penal in nature;
second, if the law is penal, it cannot apply to crimes committed be-
fore its enactment.4 6 The purpose for such restrictions is both to re-
strain legislatures from enacting "arbitrary or vindictive legislation,"
47
and to ensure that the public has fair warning of the consequences
that attach to unlawful conduct.48 Because retroactive application of
a non-penal law is constitutionally permissible,49 the crux of any ex
post facto analysis rests on whether the law in question constitutes
punishment.0
Most sex offender registration statutes have withstood constitu-
tional attacks on the grounds that such laws do not entail punish-
ment.5 ' These holdings support the traditional view that registration
43. U.S. CONST. art. I, §§ 9-10.
44. The following states apply these laws retroactively: Alaska, Arizona, California, Con-
necticut, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Louisiana, Maine, Montana, Nevada, New Jersey,
New York, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Dakota, Tennessee, Virginia, and Wash-
ington. See supra note 14 for specific statutes. The federal government, in passing the Jacob
Wetterling bill, remained silent on the issue of retroactive application. See 42 U.S.C. § 14071
(1994). For some states, the decision centered on the belief that, absent retroactive applica-
tion, the law would affect so few offenders as to render it relatively useless. See Doe v. Poritz,
662 A.2d 367, 373 (NJ. 1995) (stating that if NewJersey had excused previously convicted of-
fenders, the law "would have applied to no one").
45. See infra notes 51-56 and accompanying text (discussing registration laws that have
withstood constitutional challenges).
46. Ex post facto laws were first defined in Calderv. Bull 3 U.S. (3 DalI.) 386 (1798). Calder
established four categories of laws that violate the ex post facto clause:
Ist. Every law that makes an action done before the passing of the law, and which was
innocent when done, criminal; and punishes such action. 2d. Every law that aggra-
vates a crime, or makes it greater than it was, when committed. 3d. Every law that
changes the punishment, and inflicts a greater punishment, than the law annexed to
the crime, when committed. 4th. Every law that alters the legal rules of evidence, and
receives less, or different, testimony, than the law required at the time of the commis-
sion of the offense, in order to convict the offender.
Id. at 390.
47. Miller v. Florida, 482 U.S. 423, 429 (1987) (citing Calder, 3 U.S. (3 DalI.) at 389).
48. See id. at 430 (recognizing "lack of fair notice and governmental restraint" as central ex
post facto concerns).
49. See generally De Veau v. Braisted, 363 U.S. 144 (1960) (upholding statute prohibiting
ex-felons from holding labor union offices); Hawker v. NewYork, 170 U.S. 189 (1898) (barring
felons from practicing medicine); United States v. Huss, 7 F.3d 1444 (9th Cir. 1993)
(upholding Oregon law preventing felons from possessing long guns).
50. See Calder, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 388 (stating that the law may not punish innocence).
51. See generally State v. Noble, 829 P.2d 1217 (Ariz. 1992) (holding that registration law's
regulatory purpose outweighed its punitive effects); State v. Myers, 923 P.2d 1024 (Kan. 1996)
(holding that registration does not violate ex post facto clause), cert. denied 117 S. Ct. 2508
(1997); State v. Manning, 532 N.W.2d 244 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995) (maintaining that registration
laws are non-punitive); Snyder v. State, 912 P.2d 1127 (Wyo. 1996) (finding that registration
alone does not violate ex post facto, due process, or cruel and unusual punishment prohibi-
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is merely "a regulatory technique with a remedial purpose."52  The
situation is less clear concerning those statutes that advocate public
notification.53 Courts are split on how to approach an ex post facto
analysis. Some courts have based their assessment on factors first ar-
ticulated in the case of Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinz,54 discussed below.
Other courts have rejected the Mendoza-Martinez factors as inapplica-
ble to an ex post facto analysis, focusing instead on the legislature's
intent in enacting the statute, rather than the law's unintended puni-
tive effects. 55 Still others have developed a hybrid approach, in an at-
tempt to deal with "the confused state of the law."m An examination
of individual cases demonstrates the different standard of review im-
plicated by these tests.
1. TheMendoza-Martinez test
When a statute is not purely remedial on its face, courts will first
consider the legislative intent behind the state action.7 If the legisla-
tive intent is unclear, courts must broaden the analysis to determine
tions). But see Louisiana v. Calhoun, 669 So. 2d 1359 (La. Ct. App. 1996) (finding that registra-
tion alone violates ex post facto prohibition).
52. Artway v. Attorney Gen., 81 F.3d 1235, 1264 (3d Cir. 1996); see also United States v.
Kahriger, 345 U.S. 22 (1953) (upholding registration of professional gamblers), overru/ed on
other grounds by Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39 (1968). But see Lambert v. California,
355 U.S. 225 (1957) (invalidating registration statue aimed at parolees for lack of adequate no-
tice).
53. A number of decisions holding registration as non-punitive have done so on the basis
that notification was not an issue in the case. See Myers, 923 P.2d at 1041 (notification provi-
sions violate the ex post facto clause); Manning, 532 N.W.2d at 248 (implying notification laws
are punitive in nature); see also Artway, 81 F.3d at 1235 (upholding New Jersey's registration
laws, but indicating that consideration of non-ripe notification claims would yield a different
result).
54. 372 U.S. 144, 168-69 (1963). For decisions following the Mendoza-Martinez factors, see
Doe v. Pataki, 919 F. Supp. 691 (S.D.N.Y. 1996), affld in part and rsv'd in part, 120 F.3d 1263 (2d
Cir. 1997); Rowe v. Burton, 884 F. Supp. 1372 (D. Alaska 1994);Nob/k 829 P.2d at 1217; Myers,
923 P.2d at 1042.
55. See Doe v. Poritz, 662 A.2d 367, 402 (N.J. 1995) (referring to the Metdoza-Martinez test
as an "abstract approach"); State v. Ward, 869 P.2d 1062, 1069 (Wash. 1994) (finding thatMen-
doza-Martinez factors should only be used when "conclusive evidence of legislative intent is un-
available"). The Poritz court relied on the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Halper,
490 U.S. 435 (1989). The Court in Halperspecifically rejected use of the Mendoza-Martinez fac-
tors when assessing punishment for double jeopardy purposes. The Poritz court concluded that
"punishment for ex post facto purposes... is substantially indistinguishable from punishment
in the double jeopardy.., context...." Poritz, 662 A.2d at 402. But see Myers, 923 P.2d at 1036
(concluding that the Supreme Court endorsed these factors for ex post facto analysis in United
States v. Ursery, 116 S. Ct. 2135 (1996)).
56. Artway, 81 F.3d at 1254.
57. The Supreme Court established this standard of review for ex post facto analysis in
Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1957) (plurality opinion). In Trop, the petitioner's citizenship was
revoked under the Nationality Act of 1940 after he was convicted of wartime desertion. The
desertion occurred before the citizenship revocation sanctions were introduced. The Court
determined that the statute was penal in nature and could not be retroactively applied to the
petitioner. See id. at 94.
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whether the legislation is regulatory or punitive.! The Mendoza-
Matinez test focuses on several factors in its analysis, including:
Whether the sanction involves an affirmative disability or restraint,
whether it has historically been regarded as a punishment, whether
it comes into play only on a finding of scienter, whether its opera-
tion will promote the traditional aims of punishment-retribution
and deterrence, whether the behavior to which it applies is already
a crime, whether an alternative purpose to which it may rationally
be connected is assignable for it, and whether it agpears excessive
in relation to the alternative purpose assigned ....
In Roe v. Office of Adult Probation,60 the United States District Court
for Connecticut considered a challenge to that state's notification
laws. 6' Although the Second Circuit subsequently reversed the deci-
sion on appeal,62 the Roe case illustrates how courts can use the Men-
doza-Martinez factors to evaluate notification laws. In 1995, the Con-
necticut General Assembly amended its registration statute to include
a notification requirement.63 The statute provides for the release of
information "to any specific person, if disclosure is deemed neces-
sary.., to protect said person from any person subject to the regis-
tration [requirement] .... 6" Notification is at the discretion of local
law enforcement personnel in accordance with guidelines provided
by the Office of Adult Probation.6 The plaintiff in Roe objected to his
classification as a high-risk offenderr and sought to enjoin the state
from implementing notification procedures.67
The Roe court relied on the Mendoza-Martinez factors to conclude
that notification entailed punishment and thus violated the ex post
58. See Poitz, 662 A.2d at 404.
59. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. at 168-69 (internal citations omitted).
60. 938 F. Supp. 1080 (D. Conn. 1996), rev'd, 125 F.3d 47 (2d Cir. 1997).
61. See id. at 1083 (citing CONN. GEN. STAT. § 54-102r).
62. See Roe v. Office of Adult Probation, 125 F.3d 47 (2d Cir. 1997) (reversing lower
court's decision that Connecticut's notification statute violated the ex post facto clause).
63. See CoNN. GEN. STAT. § 54-102r (Supp. 1997).
64. Id.
65. See Roe, 988 F. Supp. at 1083. The guidelines provide for two levels of risk assessment.
Level One involves notification of the victim, his or her immediate family, individuals who
share the offender's residence and treatment providers, regardless of whether they are actually
treating the offender. Level Two is directed at "extreme cases," and expands notification to
neighbors, local school personnel, day care providers, employers, job training programs and
any other persons deemed to be "at risk." See id. at 1084.
66. The plaintiff served three years of a twelve-year sentence after pleading nolo conten-
dere to six counts of sexual assault. He spent an additional eight months in prison for proba-
tion violations, and was released in 1995. See id. at 1082-83.
67. See id. at 1085. In the plaintiff's case, notification was already underway at the time he
filed the action. Thus, the victim's family had already been informed. Upon hearing of this
lawsuit, the official in charge of notification also informed the plaintiff's employer, as well as
the manager of the apartment building in which the plaintiff lived. See id.
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facto clause of the United States Constitution." First, the court found
that the stigma created through notification imposed "an affirmative
disability or restraint" on the plaintiff. Second, the court cited rele-
vant case law to conclude that notification is traditionally viewed as
punishment.70 Third, the court concluded that the purpose of the
notification was deterrence, a "traditional goal of punishment.
7'
Fourth, because application of the notification provision is based
solely on the plaintiffs past criminal offenses, the court found notifi-
cation to be necessarily linked "with behavior that is already a
crime. "7n Finally, the court concluded that the statute's legitimate al-
ternative purpose of public safety was not tightly served by the broad,
punitive means of notification. 7
2. The Doe v. Poritz test
In Doe v. Poritz7 4 the court synthesized a number of Supreme Court
cases 75 to create a test focusing on the goal of sex offender legislation,
rather than on its consequential punitive effects. The court con-
cluded that:
[A] statute that can fairly be characterized as remedial, both in its
purpose and implementing provisions, does not constitute pun-
ishment even though its remedial provisions have some inevitable
deterrent impact, and even though it may indirectly and adversely
affect, sometimes severely, some of those subject to its provisions.
Such a law does not become punitive simply because its impact, in
part, may be punitive, unless the only explanation for that impact is
a punitive purpose: an intent to punish.
The deferential nature of the test enabled the Poritz court to effec-
tively dismiss a number of constitutional challenges to New Jersey's
Megan's Law.77 In its ex post facto analysis, the court found that the
68. See id. at 1091.
69. See id. at 1092.
70. The court relied on Artway v. Attorney General 876 F. Supp. 666, 689 (D.NJ. 1995),
reu'd in part and afr'd in part, 81 F.3d 1235 (3d Cir. 1996), and Doe v. Pataki, 919 F. Supp. 691,
701 (S.D.N.Y. 1996), aff'd inpart and rev'd inpart, 120 F.3d 1263 (2d Cir. 1997).
71. See Roe, 938 F. Supp. at 1092.
72. Id.
73. See id. at 1093.
74. 662 A.2d 367 (N.J. 1995).
75. The Poritz court relied on Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602 (1993), and United States
v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435 (1989).
76. Poritz, 662 A.2d at 388 (emphasis added).
77. In addition to ex post facto concerns, Paitz decided the following issues: (1) produc-
tion of photos and fingerprints does not constitute a search under the Fourth Amendment;
(2) the statute's purposes were remedial, not punitive, for purposes of double jeopardy, bill of
attainder, and cruel and unusual punishment clauses; (3) the privacy interest raised by public
disclosure of registrant's home address is substantially outweighed by the state's interest;
(4) "registration and notification laws were rationally related to state's interest" in public safety,
464
EFFECTIVE CONTROL OF SEXUAL OFFENDERS
legislative intent of Megan's Law was "clearly and totally remedial in
purpose.'"' Further, it held that the law's design was "as carefully tai-
lored as one could expect" in performing its remedial function,
thereby minimizing encroachment on the offender's private life.9 In
addition, the court applauded the risk factors promulgated by the At-
torney General'o as "not only rationally related, but strongly related
to the risk of reoffense."8 Although Poritz has been limited by subse-
quent casesee its punishment analysis has generated widespread dis-
cussion in otherjurisdictions.8s
3. The Artway test
Artway offers an alternative method for punishment assessment,
but does not expressly reject Poritz." Like the latter case, Artway fo-
cused on New Jersey's registration and notification laws. The lower
court in Artway upheld New Jersey's registration requirement, but
found that the notification provisions violated the constitution's ex
post facto clause. 6 The court enjoined their application against the
and thus not an infringement of Equal Protection right; and (5) due process concerns required
that the registrant be granted a hearing regarding determination of his notification status. See
id. at 387-441.
78. Id. at 404. Despite the Poritz court's assertion that the legislative intent was purely re-
medial, little legislative history exists to support this claim. The bill was passed as an
.emergency measure" in response to Megan Kanka's death; it thus bypassed the committee re-
view process and was debated only on the assembly floor. Nevertheless, it passed unanimously.
See Artway v. Attorney Gen., 81 F.3d 1235, 1243 (3d Cir. 1996). A New Jersey lawmaker con-
cluded that the resulting legislation was "vague and half-formed and left too many specifics up
to the state Attorney General." Catherine A. TrinkIe, Note,Federal Standards for Sex Offender Reg-
istration: Public Disclosure Confronts the Right to Privacy, 37 WM. & MARY L. REV. 299, 306 (1995)
(citation omitted).
79. SeePoritz, 662 A.2d at 404.
80. See supra note 30 and accompanying text (listing relevant factors in risk analysis).
81. Poritz, 662 A.2d at 404.
82. See Artway, 81 F.3d at 1263 (formulating a three-prong analysis to determine whether a
measure constitutes punishment).
83. See Doe v. Pataki, 919 F. Supp. 691, 700 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (discussing the Poritz test for
discerning punitive intent), afJ'd in part and rev'd in part, 120 F.3d 1263 (2d Cir. 1997); State v.
Myers, 923 P.2d 1024, 1034-36 (Kan. 1996) (mentioning the Poritz court's rejection of the Men-
doza-Martinez test and the adoption of a new "punitive impact" standard), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct.
2508 (1997); Snyder v. State, 912 P.2d 1127 (Wyo. 1996) (employing the"intent to punish" test
introduced in Poritz to determine whether legislation has a regulatory or punitive intent).
84. While Artway addressed many of the same issues raised in Poritz, including bill of at-
tainder, double jeopardy, and due process, the court found that these challenges with respect
to the plaintiff were not ripe. See Artway, 81 F.3d at 1252. The case therefore focused solely on
the registration provisions of the statute. See id. at 1253. The case was subsequently criticized
for failing to resolve the constitutional debate surrounding notification. See Hanley, supra note
9, at 23. A defense lawyer representing sex offenders called the decision, "a flat zero for both
sides." Id.
85. Alexander Artway had completed a seventeen-year sentence for sex offenses; at the
time of this appeal, he was married, employed, and settled in a community. See Artway, 81 F.3d
at 1235. Rather than submit to the registration requirements, he left NewJersey pending set-
dement of the case. See id.
86. Artway v. Attorney Gen., 876 F. Supp. 666, 692 (D.NJ. 1995), aff'd in part and rev'd in
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plaintiff and both sides appealed.8 7
In considering the plaintiffs ex post facto claims with regard to
registration, the court developed a three-prong testes that reviews a
statute's actual purpose, objective purpose, and effects 9 The Arway
analysis shows far less deference to legislative intent than P0ritz.
Thus, although the actual and objective purpose may appear non-
punitive, "[i]f the negative repercussions regardless of how they are
justified are great enough, the measure must be considered punish-
ment."'o In the plaintiffs case, the court found that the registration
component by itself did not constitute punishment for ex post facto
91
purposes.
B. Other Constitutional Challenges
Although registration and notification statutes have been chal-
lenged on other constitutional grounds, such as equal protection,9
privacy,9 and cruel and unusual punishment," there is less case law
concerning these issues. One reason is that courts often conclude
part, 81 F.3d 1235 (3d Cir. 1996).
87. See id. The Third Circuit was critical of the district court's handling of the case, stating
that it made its decision "in the most summary fashion." Artway, 81 F.3d at 1245. "[The court]
allowed no discovery, heard no testimony, and made no findings of fact. Instead, it ruled as a
matter of law on all the complex issues pending before it." Id.
88. The court relied on several Supreme Court decisions in developing this test, including
California Department of Corrections v. Morales, 514 U.S. 499 (1995), Department of Revenue v. Kurth
Ranch, 511 U.S. 767 (1994), Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602 (1993), United States v. Halper,
490 U.S. 435 (1989), Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144 (1963), and DeVeau v. Braisted,
363 U.S. 144 (1960). It summarized its efforts as follows: "We have thus attempted to harmo-
nize a body of doctrine that has caused much disagreement in the federal and state courts. We
realize, however, that our synthesis is by no means perfect. Only the Supreme Court knows
where all the pieces belong." Artway, 81 F.3d at 1263.
89. See Artway, 81 F.3d at 1263. The court distinguished actual purpose-the legislature's
intent-from objective purpose-whether the measure at issue has historically been regarded
as punishment. See id.
90. Id.
91. See id. at 1271. Artway's additional claims-that registration offended constitutional
double jeopardy and bill of attainder proscriptions, the equal protection clause, and was un-
constitutionally vague-were likewise dismissed. See id. The court never reached notification
claims, finding these issues unripe, as the plaintiff had left the state before the measure could
be applied to him. See id. at 1251.
92. See State v. Zichko, 923 P.2d 966 (Idaho 1996) (registration statute did not violate
equal protection); State v. Ward, 869 P.2d 1062 (Wash. 1994) (registration requirement was
constitutionally permissible).
93. See Doe v. Burton, No. 94-35734, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 12630 (9th Cir. May 13, 1996)
(use of pseudonyms not permitted when filing a claim under right to privacy); Rowe v. Burton,
884 F. Supp. 1372, 1384 (D. Alaska 1994) (holding that right to privacy"does not attach to mat-
ters within the public domain"); Doe v. Poritz, 662 A.2d 367 (N.J. 1995) (finding no reasonable
expectation of privacy in matters already exposed to public).
94. See State v. Manning, 532 N.W.2d 244 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995) (finding registration laws
non-punitive in nature); Ward, 869 P.2d at 1062 (notification laws do not represent cruel and
unusual punishment); Snyder v. State, 912 P.2d 1127 (Wyo. 1996) (registra-tion alone does not
violate cruel and unusual punishment proscription).
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these more specific challenges to be unripe.95 Typically, an offender
subject to notification will seek to enjoin the action before its execu-
tion." Thus, courts often find the injury to the plaintiff to be too
speculative. Another problem arises when a plaintiff also raises an
ex post facto challenge. For example, once a court concludes, inci-
dent to an ex post facto analysis, that a statute does not constitute
punishment, then the plaintiff's secondary claim of cruel and un-
usual punishment becomes moot.9 Nevertheless, a brief summary of
some of these secondary constitutional issues further illustrates the
controversy surrounding these laws.
1. Cruel and unusual punishment
The Eighth Amendment to the Constitution prohibits the inflic-
tion of cruel and unusual punishments.9 In some respects, the cen-
tral issue of any Eighth Amendment analysis mirrors that of an ex
post facto claim. The court must first determine whether the legisla-
tion implicates punishment.'0 That punishment, however, must be
sufficiently disproportionate to the circumscribed behavior before
Eighth Amendment protection will apply.'0 '
In Solem v. Helm,' 2 the Supreme Court articulated a three-part test
for an Eighth Amendment analysis.11 The test considers: (1) the se-
verity of the offense and the "harshness of the penalty";' °4 (2) the
comparison of that penalty to the sentences applied to other crimes
within the jurisdiction;'0 5 and (3) the similarity of the penalty to sen-
tences applied in other jurisdictions for the same offense.' 6 In the
95. See Artway, 81 F.3d at 1252 (finding notification challenges under bill of attainder,
double jeopardy, and due process theories unripe for review); State v. Myers, 923 P.2d 1024,
1044 (Kan. 1996) (finding due process concern unripe), cert. denieA 117 S. Ct. 2508 (1997).
96. See Artway, 81 F.3d at 1252 (finding enjoinment of notification not ripe for review be-
cause plaintiff had left the state).
97. This conclusion, while perhaps constitutionally sound, may nullify the central purpose
of the plaintiffs claim. If, for example, the injury sought to be avoided is the stigma resulting
from notification, forcing the plaintiff to submit to that procedure may moot his claim. The
injury would have already occurred; enjoining any further notification would offer little to no
relief. The plaintiff's only complete escape would be to move to another state, where the same
judicial "catch-22" would start anew.
98. See Roe v. Office of Adult Probation, 938 F. Supp. 1080, 1087 (D. Conn. 1996),rev'd,
125 F.3d 47 (2d Cir. 1997).
99. See U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
100. See Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 DalI.) 386 (1798).
101. See Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 367 (1910) ("[P]unishment for [a] crime
should be graduated and proportioned to [the) offense.").
102. 463 U.S. 277 (1982).
103. See id. at 292. But see Boland, supra note 6, at 219 (suggesting that the proportionality
test created in Solem may not apply to non-death penalty cases).




THE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REvIEw [Vol. 47:453
majority of cases, challenges claiming that notification and registra-
tion laws impose cruel and unusual punishment have failed. 7 This
outcome is predictable in light of the issues raised in ex post facto
challenges. Logically speaking, if a statute cannot be considered pu-
nitive for ex post facto purposes, then it will not meet the higher
standard demanded for Eighth Amendment protection.'Oe
2. Equal protection
Challenges to notification on equal protection grounds have
proved unsuccessful as well.'9 The Constitution guarantees that simi-
larly situated persons will receive equal treatment under the laws."0
The Supreme Court has developed different standards of review in
determining whether legislation violates Equal Protection."' The
lowest standard, rational basis review, demands only that the law be
reasonably related to a legitimate state interest.12 The highest level
of review, strict scrutiny, applies only to a suspect class."5 It requires
that the law be necessary to achieve compelling state interests."4 Be-
cause sex offenders do not qualify as a traditional suspect class,"5
equal protection challenges rest on a rational basis review.
"[L] egislation may impose special burdens upon defined classes in
order to achieve permissible ends. ''" 6 Historically, laws treating re-
leased felons differently from the general public have withstood con-
stitutional challenges, "1 even when the link between the state inter-
107. See State v. Zichko, 923 P.2d 966 (Idaho 1996) (finding that Idaho's registration and
notification statute does not exceed acceptable punishments); Doe v. Poritz, 662 A.2d 367 (NJ.
1995) (rejecting claim that New Jersey's statute represents cruel and unusual punishment);
Snyder v. State, 912 P.2d 1127 (Wyo. 1996) (stating that registration statute does not represent
cruel and unusual punishment); see also State v. Lammie, 793 P.2d 134 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1992)
(holding that enforcing registration is acceptable even where conviction is for attempted sexual
offense). But see In re Reed, 663 P.2d 216 (Cal. 1983) (finding that California's registration
statute violated the Eighth Amendment when applied to misdemeanor offenders).
108. In a recent case, the United States District Court for Alaska concluded that "a statute
whose punitive effects substantially interfere with the objectives of the original punishment,
including the eventual rehabilitation of the offender, is a statute whose effects are excessively
punitive." Nitz v. Otte, No. A95-486, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4930 (D. AlaskaJan. 24, 1996). The
court was considering only an ex post facto challenge. Application of this broader view of pun-
ishment, however, could yield more favorable results in Eighth Amendment cases.
109. See supra note 92 and accompanying text (listing equal protection challenges).
110. SeeU.S. CONST. amend XIV, § 1.
111. See State v. Ward, 869 P.2d 1062, 1077 (Wash. 1994).
112. See id.
113. The Supreme Court has recognized race, ethnicity, and national origin as suspect clas-
sifications. SeeBoland, supra note 6, at 226 n.145 (citation omitted).
114. See Ward, 869 P.2d at 1077.
115. See, e.g., State v. Zichko, 923 P.2d 966 (Idaho 1996); Ward, 869 P.2d at 1077.
116. Rinaldi v.Yeager, 384 U.S. 305, 309 (1966).
117. See DeVeau v. Braisted, 363 U.S. 144 (1960) (upholding statute prohibiting felons from
holding labor union offices); Hawker v. New York, 170 U.S. 189 (1898) (barring felons from
practicing medicine); United States v. Huss, 7 F.3d 1444 (9th Cir. 1993) (upholding Oregon
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ests and the laws appeared most tenuous."' Released sex offenders
thus face a difficult task in fighting registration and notification laws
on equal protection grounds. As long as the classification is not arbi-
trary, the courts are likely to uphold different treatment of sex of-
fenders."9
3. Privacy
The Supreme Court has recognized two types of privacy interests
implicit in the Constitution: 20  "the individual interest in avoiding
disclosure of personal matters";12' and "the interest in independence
in making certain kinds of important decisions."' 2 Notification stat-
utes strain against the first type of privacy right23
The Supreme Court has held that protection of one's reputation
alone is not a constitutionally-recognized privacy interest.24 In Doe v.
Poritz, ss the court focused its analysis on whether the plaintiff had "a
reasonable expectation of privacy in the information disclosed"'
26
under the notification statute. The court concluded that divulgence
law preventing felons from possessing long guns).
Additionally, in 1994, Congress amended the Federal Rules of Evidence to allow admission
of a defendant's prior offenses in sexual assault and child molestation cases. See FED. R. EVID.
413,414; see also PAUL RICE, EVIDENCE: COMMON LAW AND FEDERALRULES OFEVIDENCE 141 (3d
ed. 1996). The rule represents a departure from the standard that past offenses are inadmissi-
ble to prove character. SeeFED. R. EVID. 404(b). Congress justified this exception because the
probative value of sexual offenses outweighs any prejudice to the defendant through its admis-
sion. SeeRICE, supra, at 141.
118. See, e.g., Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24 (1974) (upholding California law denying
released felons the right to vote).
119. Note that felons convicted of arguably more dangerous crimes-including robbery
and murder-are not subject to registration. See Sex Offenses, supra note 28, at 2739.
120. Although the right of privacy is not explicitly mentioned in the Constitution, the Su-
preme Court has recognized this privilege in numerous contexts. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410
U.S. 113, 152-54 (1973) (stating that a right to privacy extends to matters relating to marriage,
procreation, contraception, and abortion); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485-86
(1965) (holding that privacy rights prohibit states from banning married couple's use of con-
traceptives).
121. Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589,599 (1977).
122. Id. at 599-600.
123. SeeACLU v. Mississippi, 911 F.2d 1066, 1069-70 (5th Cir. 1990) (defining the confiden-
tiality component as "'the right to be free from the government disclosing private facts about its
citizens and from the government inquiring into matters in which it does not have a legitimate
and proper concern'" (quoting Ramey v. City of Hedwig Village, 765 F.2d 490, 492 (5th Cir.
1985))).
124. See Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 710-12 (1976) (holding that interest in reputation is not
protected by Fourteenth Amendment). Davis concerned the police distribution of a flyer dis-
playing the name and photographs of arrested shoplifters. See id. at 695. The plaintiff unsuc-
cessfully challenged the practice, complaining that the list failed to distinguish between those
arrested and those convicted. See id. Such tactics are still in practice. For example, one Massa-
chusetts police chief regularly broadcasts the names and photos of people who have been ar-
rested rather than convicted, referring to them as "punk of the week" or "toilet licking mag-
gots." See 20/20 (ABC television broadcast, Oct. 18, 1996).
125. 662 A.2d 367 (NJ. 1995).
126. Id. at 406.
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of the plaintiffs prior offenses, age, automobile information, and
photograph and fingerprints did not violate his right to pivacy.'2 Al-
though the court did recognize a privacy interest in disclosure of the
plaintiff's home address, 8 it found that the state interest in public
safety outweighed the invasion of privacy.12
Other courts have embraced the idea that sexual offenders have a
reduced expectation of privacy. In People v. Mills,'" the California
Court of Appeals rejected a privacy claim, stating that the defendant's
act of molesting a child effectively renounced his right to privacy.3'
In State v. Ward,132 the Supreme Court of Washington relied on legis-
lative findings to conclude that sex offenders have a reduced expec-
tation of privacy due to the dual interests of public safety and effec-
tive government operation. 33 In Rowe v. Burton,"3 the Alaska federal
district court concluded that privacy rights do not apply "to matters
already within the public domain. ' '  A constitutional challenge
based on privacy rights will likely afford the offender little relief.
III. PUBLIC POLICY ISSUES: PUBLIC SAFETYAND THEJUSTIFICATION
FOR REGISTRATION AND NOTIFICATION LAWS
Constitutional infirmities are not the only means by which inter-
127. See id. at 407; see also Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967) (stating that Fourth
Amendment protection does not apply to things that an individual "knowingly exposes to the
public"); Doe v. City of NewYork, 15 F.3d 264, 268 (2d Cir. 1994) (holding that"an individual
person cannot expect to have a constitutionally protected privacy interest in matters of public
record"). But see United States Dep't of Defense v. Federal Labor Relations Auth., 510 U.S. 487,
500 (1994) ("An individual's interest in controlling the dissemination of information regarding
personal matters does not dissolve simply because that information may be available to the
public in some form.").
128. See Porit, 662 A.2d at 408 (stating that the disclosure of home addresses "implicate[s]
privacy interests").
129. See id. at 412-13 (holding that state's interest was "legitimate and substantial").
130. 146 Cal. Rptr. 411 (Ct. App. 1978).
131. See id. at 417 (stating that a person who molests a child has "waived any right to pri-
vacy").
132. 869 P.2d 1062 (Wash. 1994) (en banc).
133. See id. at 1069-70.
134. 884 F. Supp. 1372 (D. Alaska 1994).
135. Id. at 1384. But seejerusalem, supra note 18, at 244 (stating that notification goes be-
yond the scope of information available as a matter of public record). Courts have echoed this
sentiment. See Nitz v. Otte, No. A95-486, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4930, at *21 (D. AlaskaJan. 24,
1996) (arguing that public records are far more difficult to search when names are not pro-
vided through notification); Washington v. Ward, 869 P.2d 1062, 1071 (Wash. 1994) (warning
that the scope of disclosure "must be rationally related to the goals of public safety"). Although
the Third Circuit in Arlway found the defendant's privacy claims unripe, it too found notifica-
tion more intrusive than mere public records. "[U]nlike the mere fact of his past conviction,
which might be learned from an employment questionnaire or public records, notification un-
der Megan's Law features that State's determination-based overwhelmingly on past conduct-
that the prior offender is [a] future danger to the community." Shannon P. Duffy, Third Circuit
Upholds Portion of Megan's Law, LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, Apr. 15, 1996, at 1.
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ested parties may challenge registration and notification laws. The
judicial uncertainty pervading these statutes ignores a more pertinent
question: are these measures effective?ss The answer depends on
the purpose for which such legislation is offered.
A. Public Safety
Registration and notification laws often are enacted on the premise
that they promote public safety.3 7  Americans describe crime as
among their chief concerns;s when that crime is directed at chil-
dren, their concern is multiplied.3 9 Politicians,'4 0 the judiciary,4 and
the media42 all have characterized the laws as balancing devices
whose benefit to the public outweighs the burden to offenders. They
rely on often controversial arguments to support this conclusion.
1. Recidivism
The strongest argument in support of registration and notification
laws is the purportedly high recidivism rate among sexual offend-143
ers. Yet statistics conflict on this issue. Although some sources es-
136. See generally Ball, supra note 6, at 442-43 (finding that notification laws do not protect
the public);Jerusalem, supra note 18, at 230-31 (stating that notification laws fail to satisfy legis-
lative goals of safety). But see Boland, supra note 6, at 225-26 (arguing that registration and no-
tification, though not completely effective, are at least one means of controlling sex offense);
Sheila A. Campbell, Note, Battling Sex Offenders: Is Megan's Law an Effective Means at Achieving
Public Safety?, 19 SETON HALL LEGIS.J. 519, 521 (1995) (stating that Megan's Law"is simply too
little too late").
137. See State v. Myers, 923 P.2d 1024, 1032 (Kan. 1996) (stating that the overwhelming
concern in passing the Kansas statute was promotion of public safety), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct.
2508 (1997); Snyder v. State, 912 P.2d 1127, 1131 (Wyo. 1996) (concluding intent of sex of-
fender registration statute is to protect children).
138. A recent poll of 1000 adults nationwide found that 61% worry"a great deal" that crime
will increase, and 49% fear that they or a close relative would be the victim of a violent crime.
See Mario A. Brossard & Richard Morin, American Voters Focus on Worries Close to Home, WASH.
POST, Sept. 15, 1996, at A18. Additionally,"[w]omen under age 35 who live in cities fear rape
more than murder, and over half restrict their activities as a result of this fear." HALL, supra
note 21, at 10.
139. See supra note 8 and accompanying text (suggesting that passage of state statues has
been in response to violent crime against children). In addition to adopting a national
"Megan's Law," Congress has proposed expanding federal jurisdiction over violent sexual
crime, and requiring a life sentence without parole after a second conviction. See National
"Megan's Law" Approved in House, WASH. POST, May 8, 1996, at A14 [hereinafter National
"Megan's Law"].
140. See National "Megan's Law, "supra note 139, at A14 ("'With this bill we put the rights of
children above the rights of convicted sex offenders.'") (quoting Rep. Dick Zimmer, R-N.J.).
141. See Nitz v. Otte, No. A95-486, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4930, at *23 (D. Alaska Jan. 24,
1996) ("The balance of hardships tips significantly against the [offender] vis-a-vis the public.").
142. "Amid a plethora of concerns, issues and facts, there is no greater than this: the pas-
sion we all share to keep our children safe and sound." Anna Quindlen, Public and Private: The
Passion to Keep Them Safe N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 1, 1994, at BI.
143. See Ball, supra note 6, at 408 n.36 ("[I]t is difficult to determine whether sex crime re-
cidivism is higher than the recidivism rates for other crimes.") (citation omitted).
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timate the recidivism rate among sexual offenders to be as great as
sixty-five percent,'" other studies report much lower figures.' 45 Com-
prehensive analysis of empirical studies on the issue has found recidi-
vism rates for pedophilia and rape to be lower than the national av-
erage for other crimes." Why then are sexual predators singled out?
There are a number of possible explanations.
First, recidivism estimates are only as good as the data behind
them. Historically, sexual crimes have been underreported. 47 Both
victims and offenders are usually unwilling to admit to these encoun-
ters, perhaps because of the shame associated with these crimes. '48
Consequently, some estimates may be inflated to account for un-
documented offenses.
Second, the variables among these individual studies are not fixed.
Researchers often will employ different methods for obtaining their
data.49 The definition of an "offense" may change,"o as well as the
behaviors that qualify as "reoffense." The period may be restricted to
only a few years, or extended over a much longer period of time."'
In addition, information vital to understanding the results-for ex-
ample, whether the offenders studied were receiving treatment-is
often omitted. The result is a pool of conflicting information that
may be manipulated to serve any viewpoint.
144. See David Van Biema, A Cheap Shot at Pedophilia? California Mandates Chemical Castration
for Repeat Child Molesters, TIME, Sept. 9, 1996, at 60. But seeJerusaem, supra note 18, at 220 n.5
(stating that estimates more than 60% are largely exaggerated).
145. See Donna Lieberman, Megan's Law: An Asset or a Quick Fix?, N.Y. LJ.,Jan. 17, 1996, at
2 n.2 (noting recidivism rates as low as 8.5% for sex offenders who receive treatment).
146. See RICE, supra note 117, at 141-42 (quoting Professor Thomas Reed as saying that
"there is nothing particularly unique about sex offenses" to justify different rules). Addition-
ally, a 1989 study from the Bureau of Justice Statistics found that, among the offenses meas-
ured, "only homicide had a lower recidivism rate [than sexual offenses]." Id. at 142 (citation
omitted).
147. See L. Furby et al., Sex Offender Recidivism: A Review, PSYCHOL. BULL., Jan. 1989, at 105
(stating that recidivism rates for sexual offenders are difficult to measure because of underre-
porting); Andrew Vachss, If We Really Want to Protect Our Children, PARADE, Nov. 3, 1996, at 5
("More cases of child sexual abuse are never reported than are ever tried.").
148. See Vachss, supra note 147, at 5 (noting that children often "stop remembering" to es-
cape the trauma); see also SAMPSON, supra note 3, at 7 (discussing the reluctance of offenders in
admitting their crimes, even after conviction). The public may interpret this denial as a lack of
remorse on the part of the offender, strengthening the image of offenders as monsters.
149. See Ball, supra note 6, at 408 (pointing out disparity in statistics).
150. For example, the rate of child molestation is especially difficult to track, in part be-
cause molestation may have many interpretations. See id. at 408 n.41 (discussing various defini-
tions of "child molester").
151. One Canadian study examined long-term recidivism rates among nearly two hundred
child molesters; it found that 42% reoffended over a period of fifteen years. See R. K. Hanson
et al., Long-term Recidivism of Child Molesters, 61 J. CONSULT. CLIN. PSYCHOL., Aug. 1993, at 646-
52. By contrast, an earlier Canadian study limited to a three-year period reported recidivism
rates of only 11%. See R. A. Lang et al., Treatment of Incest and Pedophilic Offenders: A Pilot Study,
BEHAV. SC. LAW 1988, at 239-55.
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Finally, the greatest reason for the disparity may be the nature of
the offense itself. Victims of sexual crimes are usually women or
children,' 52 groups traditionally considered among the most vulner-
able within our society. Unlike other crimes that may have a higher
recidivism rate,'" sexual offenses affect the victim in a far more intru-
sive way. The long term psychological effects of these violations are
well documented.) Furthermore, society has historically reacted to
the threat of sexual offense with panic and fear.'55 The public out-
rage concerning sexual offenses and their lasting psychological im-
pact may cause further inflation of the data to support special rules.'6
2. Deterrence
Supporters of registration and notification laws believe that these
measures reduce recidivism rates by deterring future criminal behav-
ior.'57 This purported deterrence is two-fold. First, parents of young
children will better protect their children once a risk is identified.
Second, offenders themselves will be less likely to repeat their crimes
if they know that authorities and the public are closely monitoring
their activities.Is9 Although these arguments have some merit, they
contain several logical and factual problems. First, many commenta-
152. See Jerusalem, supra note 18, at 221 n.9 (discussing the importance of protecting chil-
dren who have been assaulted).
153. For instance, a three-year study found the recidivism rate for rape was 7.7%, while the
recidivism rate for burglary was 31.9%. See RACE, supra note 117, at 142 (citing data from the
Bureau of Justice Statistics). Certainly burglary, like rape, poses a threat to public safety; it in-
volves the unlawful entry of a building for committing a crime. See MODEL PENAL CODE
§ 221.1(1) (1962). Yet, burglars are not required to notify neighbors of their presence in a
community, despite the higher probability that they will reoffend, perhaps putting those same
neighbors at risk. The explanation would seem to lie in the public outrage over sexual crime,
and its direct effect on children.
154. See SAMPSON, supra note 3, at xiii ("Sexual crime leaves women, children and men with
psychological and physical scars which may never heal.").
155. Documented evidence of panic outbreaks dates back as far as the Middle Ages, when
child abuse was linked to devil worship, and friars suspected of the crime were burned at the
stake. See id. at xii. In the 16th Century, France was overcome with "anti-rape hysteria in re-
sponse to a series of gang rapes. See id. And the aristocracy of 18th Century Europe was "swept
with a wave of hysteria about the possibility that their children would be sexually molested by
chambermaids and nurses." Id. This last example has a modern counterpart; the recent pro-
liferation of the so-called "nanny cam," which enables parents to spy secretly on their day care
providers via tiny concealed video cameras, is further evidence of the scope of these fears. See
Ian Katz, World News in Brief. Minding the Child-Minder, GUARDIAN, July 18, 1996, at 15
(reporting large number of "nanny cam" sales).
156. Although recidivism rates are frequently used in support of these laws, some experts
have concluded that, "'it is virtually impossible to predict future criminal conduct with any de-
gree of accuracy.'" Doe v. Poritz, 662 A.2d 367, 384 (N.J. 1995) (quoting Schall v. Martin, 467
U.S. 253, 278 (1984)).
157. Note that, although deterrence is one of traditional alms of punishment, courts have
repeatedly classified notification laws as non-punitive. See infra Part IIA
158. "If [an offender] knows we're here and that we know he's there, he's less likely to
wander around." Gottleib, supra note 22, at A3 (internal quotes omitted).
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tors argue that notification laws create a false sense of security."
Only five to ten percent of sex offenders are ever caught; the vast ma-
jority is therefore never subject to notification.' 60 Further, experts es-
timate that seventy to eighty percent of children are molested by
someone they know.16' Thus, in focusing on a particular individual
within the community at large, parents may forget that the greatest
risk children face from sexual offense comes from within their own
circle. 62
The argument that public awareness further restrains sexual of-
fenders is also faulty. First, the offender subjected to notification
generally knows which persons in the community have notice of his
status. If the statute calls for neighborhood notification, for exam-
ple, the individual seeking to reoffend need only target victims out-
side his community." Secondly, because the degree of notification
varies from state to state, the offender can relocate in an area with
less intrusive laws.1'5 In reality, notification simply serves to change
159. See Ball, supra note 6, at 442-43 (stating that notification statutes create the impression
that society has eliminated the threat of sexual offense); Jerusalem, supra note 18, at 247
(speculating that awareness of a particular threat causes parents to "let their guard down").
160. SeeLombardi, supra note 36, atWC13.
161. See id. Patricia Lemp, director of a New York treatment center for child sexual abuse,
states that most children "are abused by someone they and their family know and know well."
Id. Despite such evidence, parents rarely warn their children of the risk posed by intimates.
One survey found that less than a third of parents discuss the threat of sexual abuse with their
children, and only 22% warn their children that a relative could be a sexual offender. See Ball,
supra note 6, at 447 n.289.
162. See HALL, supra note 21, at 3 (stating that most sexual perpetrators "are acquainted
with their victims and include husbands and fathers") (citation omitted). A secondary, negative
effect of notification is the fear and anxiety it creates within a community. Parents may overact
to a potential threat from an offender in a manner that greatly affects the quality of life of their
children. One commentator described the reaction in a Washington community "as if some-
one had shouted Fire!"; the ensuing panic caused many parents to keep their children indoors
from fear of attack. SeeJerusalem, supra note 18, at 248 (citation omitted). Child advocates
warn of the detrimental effects such panic creates. "To the extent that parents are freaked out,
children are freaked out." Gottleib, supra note 22, at A3 (statement ofJudith Hyde, Executive
Director, Children's Law Center).
163. In practice, those subject to notification will often relocate to poorer communities
whose resources for tracking sexual offenders are more limited. See Ball, supra note 6, at 434
n.210 ("[L]arge cities and inner city areas have become safe havens for migrating sex offend-
ers.") (citation omitted).
164. SeeJenny A. Montana, Note, An Ineffective Weapon in the Fight Against Child Sexual Abuse:
New Jersey's Megan's Law, 3.J.L. & POL'Y 569, 587 (1995) (noting that nearly half of all sexual
offenders in Washington moved out of state to escape such stringent notification).
Congress has recently addressed this problem. In March 1996, SenatorJoseph Biden Jr. of
Delaware and Senator Phil Gramm of Texas introduced legislation calling for a national regis-
try for sex offenders. See Congressional Press Release, Fed. Doc. Clearinghouse Inc., Mar. 28,
1996. The legislation proposes stiff penalties for offenders who move out of state to escape reg-
istration, and provides for a nationwide warning if an offender fails to comply. See id. "[W]e
need to build a nationwide system where all movement of sexually violent and child offenders
can be traced so that we can do everything possible to make sure none of these predators will
fall between the cracks." Id. (statement of Sen. Biden). President Clinton quickly embraced
the idea, ordering Attorney General Janet Reno to develop a national tracking system for sex-
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the identity of the victim, rather than the behavior of the offender.
B. Public Policy
Closely linked to these public safety arguments is the widespread
belief that no viable alternatives to registration and notification laws
exist. Lifetime imprisonment is too impractical and expensive to be
an effective remedy in dealing with sexual predators.ss Further,
many experts believe that sexual deviants cannot be cured.'6 The re-
sult has been a nationwide reduction in prison treatment programs
targeted at sexual deviance. 67
Political motivation is another reason sex offender registration laws
are so prevalent. Sexual predators are so universally vilified that few
politicians are willing to step forward "on their behalf." This is espe-
cially apparent during an election year, when any tendency to appear
soft on crime may result in lost votes.'6 The result is a flurry of activ-
ity that often has "more political than crime-fighting value."'6
ual predators. See Nancy Mathis, Clinton Orders National Registry for Sex Offenders, HOUS. CHRON.,
June 23, 1996, at A16.
165. See Boland, supra note 6, at 184; see also Diane Brady, Radical Treatment: A Special Pro-
gram in Manitoba Seks to Put Sex Offenders Back in Society, MACLEAN's, Apr. 26, 1993, at 38 (stating
that "[m]ost psychologists agree that the best way to reduce sexual offenses is through lifelong
treatment-not lifelong incarceration").
166. See Ball, supra note 6, at 408 n.43 (noting the absence of evidence of effectiveness in
treating sex offenders).
167. See Sabrina L. Miller, Sex-Abuse Law Tough to Enforce; Police Unsure Where Many Offenders
Live CHI. TRiB.,Jan. 4, 1996, at DI. At least some of these reductions may be attributed to the
general public's opinion that the money already spent on incarceration is enough; instead, ex-
tra funds should be channeled to recovery programs for victims of sexual crimes. See HALL,
supra note 21, at 12.
168. In the 1988 presidential campaign, then-Vice President George Bush used such tactics
to great advantage. As governor of Massachusetts, Bush's opponent, Michael Dukakis had pre-
sided over a weekend furlough program for convicted felons. One of the inmates involved was
Willie Horton, who had been serving a life sentence without parole for the 1975 stabbing death
of a teenager. During one of his weekends free from the prison, Horton held a Maryland cou-
ple captive for several hours, raping the wife and stabbing the husband. The Bush campaign
latched onto this tragic incident and ran numerous ads throughout the country, effectively
transforming Governor Dukakis' allegedly weak position on crime enforcement into the Achil-
les heel of his campaign. See Murray Kempton, Bush Tactics Turn Ugly, NEWSDAY, Oct. 30, 1988,
at 7.
169. Editorial, The Sex Offender Next Door, ST. Louis POST-DISPATCH, May 15, 1996, at B6.
For example, Megan's Law was just one of numerous crime prevention initiatives signed or
proposed by the Clinton administration in 1996. In his remarks at the signing ceremony for
Megan's Law, President Clinton also mentioned the recent addition of police officers and the
fact that his crime prevention efforts were "ahead of schedule and under budget." Clinton Re-
marks, supra note 1. Additional election year proposals included teen curfews, mandatory
school uniforms, and stiffer penalties for gang related violence. See Mathis, supra note 164, at
A16. Several Republican commentators suggested that Presidential support for a national sex
offender registry was politically motivated. "We're glad to have the President's endorsement.
It's difficult not to notice that when the bill was being written and offered that it was hard to
find any support from the White House." Id. (statement of Larry Neal, spokesman for Republi-
can Sen. Phil Gramm).
4751997]
THE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REViEW [Vol. 47:453
IV. PRACTICAL EFFECT OF REGISTRATION AND NOTIFICATION LAWS
A. Vigilantism and Rehabilitation
In practice, registration and notification measures implemented to
advance public safety may do more harm than good. In the first
place, community notification has resulted in a nationwide onslaught
of persistent, often violent attacks upon sexual offenders.' 70 A Texas
offender, released after eleven years in prison, was forced out of six
towns and refused admittance to more than 200 halfway houses.17' In
New Jersey, a father and son broke into the home of a former child
molester, but inadvertently assaulted the wrong man." A Washing-
ton community set fire to the home of a first-time offender upon his
early release from prison.'" Such examples seem to counter hopes
that the public will use notification information "only to protect and
not to punish."'74
A second unintended result of notification is the possibility that
such laws may result in fewer offenders being punished. Convictions
are difficult in sexual assault cases; 75 the majority of offenders actu-
ally incarcerated are sent to prison as a result of agreeing to guilty
pleas.' 76 It is questionable whether those offenders would have taken
170. The number of actual attacks is difficult to judge, because few state statutes contain
provisions by which to track such instances. See Lieberman, supra note 145, at 2. A three-year
Washington state study found, however, that eight percent of sex offenders subject to notifica-
tion had received some type of harassment, including rock throwing and death threats. See The
Sex Offender Next Door, supra note 169, at 6B. In Doe v. Poritz, 662 A.2d 367 (N.J. 1995), the New
Jersey Supreme Court sidestepped the harassment issue: "[W]e expect that the information
disclosed will be used as intended: as a means of protection, not as a means of harassment." Id.
at 409. Further, supporters theorize that because such attacks are committed by private rather
than state actors, no government disability is imposed by public notification. See Bruce Fein,
Megan's Law: When a Sex Offender Moves In, Is There a Duty to Warn the Community?, 81 A.B.A.J. 38
(1995).
171. See Rick Hampson, What's Gone Wrong with Megan's Law?, USA TODAY, May 14, 1997, at
Al.
172. See Poritz, 662 A.2d at 430. Authorities had distributed photographs of the offender
and notified local residents of the man's address only two weeks before the assault. The beat-
ing was severe enough to require hospitalization of the victim. See id.
173. See Lieberman, supra note 145, at 2. The offender was convicted of statutory rape and
received early release for good behavior. Arson was the last step in a series of community or-
ganized protests against his pending release. The offender attempted to relocate in New Mex-
ico, but similar demonstrations there again forced him out of town. See id.
174. Poritz, 662 A.2d at 376. Vigilante attacks affect the offender's family and friends as well.
For example, a Washington community sent death threats to the grandparents of a released
offender. See Ball, supra note 6, at 433. NewJersey residents attacked the roommates of Megan
Kanka's assailant. See id.
175. See Lombardi, supra note 36, at WC1 (noting New York State therapist's belief that only
five to ten percent of all sexual offenders actually receive prison sentences).
176. See id. (asserting that most sexual offenders avoid detection or conviction and that
those who are detected usually accept plea bargains).
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such pleas if community notification had been part of the package.m
Notification's greatest potential cost, however, may lie in its indi-
rect encouragement of continued criminal behavior. Released felons
are under enormous pressure to "make a fresh start.' '78  Rehabilita-
tion is dependent upon the released offender's ability to reintegrate
into society.'7 Notification laws impinge on that rehabilitation. For
example, even if an employer were personally willing to ignore his
employee's criminal conviction, public awareness of the crime may
make him less willing to risk public disapproval.18 Additionally, as
notification laws spread to every state,'8' the stigma of conviction will
follow the offender wherever he goes.8 2 The result may be that the
offender simply adopts the role society has given him-the brutal, in-
curable monster-at the expense of future victims.s 3 Furthermore,
psychologists have identified anger and lack of stability as the chief
catalysts that prompt sexual offenders to attack.'14 Notification laws
may directly antagonize those factors, thus increasing the likelihood
that offenders will strike again.
B. Practical Impact
The procedural difficulties inherent in the application of notifica-
177. See id. (discussing critic's charges that community notification of sex offender status
constitutes an unconstitutional imposition of retroactive punishment on offenders who have
already served prison sentences or probation).
178. See Mary Lynne Velinga, Crackdown on Sex Offenders Raises Tough Questions, SAC.
RAMENTO BEE, Feb. 2, 1997, atAl (discussing concerns over sex offender legislation).
179. See CathyYoung, Look Before Leaping on Megan's Law, DET. NEWS, May 21, 1996, at A7.
180. In addition to hindering a released offender's ability to initially find work, retroactive
application of these laws has resulted in the dismissal of a number of parolees already success-
fully employed. For examples of such incidents, see Doe v. Pataki, 919 F. Supp. 691, 697
(S.D.N.Y. 1996) (describing how parolee lost job after his conviction was publicized through
mass mailing), aFd in part and rev'd in part, 120 F.3d 1263 (2d Cir. 1997); Boland, supra note 6,
at 186 (detailing offender's eviction from his home and forced expulsion from vocational train-
ing program). Community-wide efforts to force a released offender out of the area are equally
difficult to resist due to the inevitable peer pressure to join the mob mentality. SeeTracey-Lynn
Clough, Neighbors Warned About Sex Offender, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, May 24, 1996, at Al
(describing Texas resident's fear of retaliation from neighbors after objecting to their treat-
ment of released sex offender).
181. See supra notes 16-20 and accompanying text (discussing national implementation of
TheJacob Wetterling Crime Bill).
182. See supra note 164 and accompanying text (detailing legislative proposals for a national
registry that would track offenders interstate). The impulse to move has another negative side
effect. In escaping to another state to avoid notification, the offender may also be isolating
himself from vital tools of rehabilitation such as family and treatment. See Montana, supra note
164, at 580-85 (noting that offender's rejection by community decreases chances for effective
treatment).
183. "[N]obody can live in a house with a sign out front that says 'Hi! I raped a child.'
They'll get out and soon realize that no matter what they do, they're seen as evil, so they may as
well be evil." Jerusalem, supra note 18, at 247 (citation omitted).
184. SeeADELE MAYER, SEX OFFENDERS: APPROACHES TO UNDERSTANDING AND MANAGEMENT
43 (1988) (listing factors indicating high-risk candidates for therapy).
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tion laws create additional problems for both offenders and officials.
In the first place, many state statutes assign notification levels accord-
ing to the risk posed by the individual offender."" Thus, the official
in charge of assigning a risk level must perform a task that many ex-
perts believe is impossible: predicting an offender's future criminal
behavior.s When that official is uncertain, he or she is likely to err
on the side of caution and apply a notification level that exceeds the
scope of the existing risk.17 Therefore, "two thirds of the sex offend-
ers will be improperly assessed."8s Typically, little recourse exists for
the offender subjected to improper notification. Although appeal of
one's classification is possible," the process is onerous.'9° Often the
offender challenging notification has been released from prison only
recently, and thus lacks the support and resources necessary to
launch an objection. Legal help is expensive as well; an automatic
right to court-appointed counsel does not apply because courts often
classify notification assessment as an administrative rather than puni-
185. See, e.g., NJ. STAT. ANN. § 2C:7 (West 1995 & Supp. 1997);N.Y. CORRECT. LAW § 168-
1(6) (McKinney Supp. 1997).
186. The task of risk assessment generally falls to the local police or prosecutor, individuals
lacking psychological expertise. See Ball, supra note 6, at 441. Yet, even trained professionals
find the task difficult. In a recent study, a team of psychologists and psychiatrists were asked to
predict the likelihood of re-arrest among sexual offenders. See HALL, supra note 21, at 84. They
based their analysis on many of the same variables considered by prosecutors and police. See
supra note 30 and accompanying text (listing relevant risk factors). Yet, the trained profession-
als were successful in their predictions only 53% of the time, a figure "which barely exceeds
chance." HALL, supra, at 84. But see Jerry Adler & Peter Annin, Too Dangerous to Set Free?,
NEWSWEEK, Dec. 9, 1996, at 39 ("[E]xperts can indeed predict which offenders are most likely
to get into trouble again . ..").
187. See HALL, supra note 21, at 76 (asserting that clinicians often have difficulty predicting
future sexual aggressiveness). Officials who do err generally are insulated from civil liability,
absent evidence of gross negligence or bad faith. SeeJerusalem, supra note 18, at 230.
188. Ball, supra note 6, at 441.
189. But see id. at 431 n.182 (noting that Illinois' statute has no provision for appeal of one's
notification status). States that include some provision impose tough restrictions. NewJersey,
for example, gives the offender only two weeks to file an appeal before notification begins. See
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:7. This restriction has been successfully challenged. See In re Registrant
A.B., 667 A.2d 200 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1995) (allowing for late filing of notification appeal).
190. In State v. Ross, the court described New York's appeal process:
The offender who wishes to challenge this assessment is in the position of bringing
forth evidence to controvert the Board's finding. If the Board finds, for example, that
the offender's recent behavior was poor and his psychological profile indicates a lack
of remorse, the offender has been given notice that the Board relied on these factors
and his opportunity to be heard requires him to present evidence to controvert the
Board's finding.... In contesting these findings, the person who challenges them
should have the burden of proof....
646 N.Y.S.2d 249, 251-52 (1996). Except for the offender's own testimony, it is unclear what
evidence would be sufficient to challenge a finding of lack of remorse. Illinois' standard for
appeal is equally difficult: the offender must establish through clear and convincing evidence
"that future registration will not serve the purposes of the statute." State v. Ward, 869 P.2d
1062, 1074 (Wash. 1994) (citing People v. Adams, 144 III.2d 381,387 (1991)).
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ive function. 9' Furthermore, instigating a public suit provides little
relief; even if the offender can win on the merits, he must appear in
court in person to avoid forfeiture.92 The result may be encourage-
ment of the very publicity he seeks to avoid.93
The broad language inherent in many notification statutes also en-
sures that individuals not intended as targets of notification fall
within the auspices of such legislation.'9 For example, many of the
state statutes fail to distinguish a crime as heinous as molestation
from the (usually more benign) situation of consensual statutory
rape.'9 Thus, a twenty-year-old male who had a brief affair with a
teenage girl might be subjected to some level of intrusive notifica-
191. See Ross, 646 N.Y.S.2d at 249 (stating that assessment will only be reviewed for arbitrari-
ness); Ward, 869 P.2d at 1076 (holding that fhilure to warn defendant of collateral consequence
of notification did not violate due process clause); see also Patricia Tennison &Joseph Sjostrom,
Sex Offender Law Hits Snag: Registration Faces Lega Practical Hurdles, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 17, 1996, at
Li (noting concerns of ACLU that many notification laws lack adequate provisions for hearings
and representation by counsel). Attempts to remedy the situation have met with resistance. In
Doe v. Porits, the court held that indigent offenders seeking to challenge notification would be
provided with counsel and "strongly suggest[ed] that legislation providing for that representa-
tion be adopted." Doe v. Poritz, 662 A.2d 367, 382 (NJ. 1995). Because so many lawyers ob-
jected to defending released sex offenders, however, the NewJersey attorney general created a
new branch of the public defender service to handle the cases. See Robert Hanley, State Agency
to Defend Sex Offenders, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 31, 1995, at B5.
192. SeeMatthew Goldstein, Opportunity to Appeal Status Enough Under Offender Law, N.Y. LJ.,
July 18, 1996, at 1 ("A right to be present may be lost based on public policy when a defen-
dant's conduct unambiguously indicates a defiance of the processes of law and disrupts the
court proceeding.").
193. See id. (noting that offender may forfeit rights by failing to appear in court to challenge
designation as possible repeat offender under New York's sex offender registration law). At
least one federal court has refused to allow offenders to challenge notification under pseudo-
nyms. See Doe v. Burton, No. 94-35734, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 12630 (9th Cir. May 13, 1996)
(stating that the court cannot assess the pseudonym issue until the information sought to be
protected is revealed to the court).
194. In 1997, the state of Wisconsin attracted national attention after prosecuting an 18-
year-old boy for sexual assault on his 15-year-old girlfriend. See Roberto Suro, Town Faults Law,
Not Be, In Sex Case, WASH. POST, May 11, 1997, at Al. Authorities became aware of the case
only after the girl became pregnant and the couple made plans to marry. Because the law re-
quired only that the offender be of age and the partner a minor, the jury was forced to convict.
Although the judge had the discretion to reduce or eliminate any jail sentence, up to forty
years under statute, the boy's name was automatically entered in the sex offender registry. See
id.
In another instance, a 15-year-old New Jersey boy suddenly became subject to 15 years of
registration after completing three years of probation for molesting his stepbrother. See
Young, supra note 179, at 20. In another case, a 59-year-old offender was targeted for notifica-
tion after pleading guilty to statutory rape. See id. His conviction arose, however, only after his
victim attempted to blackmail him five years after the incident. Authorities then pressured the
man to leave his home because of its proximity to an elementary school. One state statute,
which contains a lifetime restriction barring released offenders from living with anyone under
age 18, unintentionally prevents offenders who target adults from raising their own children.
See Anne Schlater, Sex Offender Law Could Separate Parent, Child, MONTGOMERYADVERTISER, July
27, 1996, at F3.
195. But see ELIZABETH RICE ALLGEIER & ALBERT RICHARD ALLGEIER, SEXUAL INTERAaTIONS
659 (1991) (noting that even consensual sex is actionable under statutory rape laws, because a
minor is presumed incapable of giving informed consent).
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tion, depending on where he lived." Secondly, notification deci-
sions are often left in the hands of the local prosecutors or police.
9 7
They determine the scope of persons to notify, and the extent of the
information to disseminate. This system opens the door for potential
abuse, with decisions made not based on actual threats, but on other
factors such as sexual orientation, race, or economic status.' 98 Fur-
ther, notification laws abandon traditional goals of rehabilitation
with respect to juveniles. As a rule, juvenile records are sealed to in-
crease the offender's ability to make a fresh start without the stigma
generated by past transgressions99 Notification defeats that purpose:
the fifteen-year-old boy who made a single, grievous error and was
later treated now may be subject to years of intrusive notification."
Finally, there is always the possibility that the offender has been
wrongly convictedYm The individual who was convicted of a crime he
did not commit will now see that injustice multiplied, perhaps for the
remainder of his life.
Ultimately, the success of notification laws depends upon an al-
ready flawed premise: that offenders will submit themselves to the
burden of notification by registering with authorities in the first
place. Registration laws as they currently stand are almost impossible
to enforce, and authorities rarely have accurate estimates as to the
level of compliance. 3  The financial and practical costs of tracking
196. Some states such as New York and NewJersey impose at least some level of notification
eyen on low-risk offenders.
197. See Ball, supra note 6, at 441.
198. The ACLU has characterized notification as giving police "one more opportunity to
engage in harassment." Laura A. Kiernan, New Law Tough on Offenders: Those With Sex Convic-
tions Must Register With State, BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 15, 1993, at 37.
199. See Judge Kent Ellis, Justice System: Past and Present, 33 HOus. LAw. 24, 25 (1995)
(describing rationale behind sealing ofjuvenile records).
200. Many notification laws "fail to distinguish between two teenagers who are petting and a
vicious sex pervert or pedophile." Tennison & Sjostrom, supra note 195, at Li.
201. The possibility of an erroneous conviction may be more prevalent in sex offense cases
than with other crimes for two reasons. First, in molestation cases, convictions often turn on
the testimony of small children whose statements arguably are less reliable than those of adults.
See Susan Seahorn, Child Sex Abus 29 CHAMPION 27 (1995) ("[Children) confuse imagination,
fantasy, and confabulation with reality ... .") (citation omitted). Further, in seeking informa-
tion, therapists and attorneys may rely heavily on the use of leading questions that may taint the
child's testimony. See id. ("If suggestive or coercive interview techniques are employed, the
child's memory of the events may be irremediably damaged at every interview."). Second, the
recent controversy surrounding recovered memories-memories of sexual abuse that are sup-
pressed and later recovered through therapy--also presents concerns. See Hm.L, supra note 21,
at 102-03. Many believe that recovered memories are created by therapist suggestion rather
than recollection of actual events. See id. at 102. The media publicity surrounding the fre-
quency of sex abuse may also contribute to false memories. See id.
202. Alabama, Arizona, California, Delaware, and Florida impose a lifetime requirement of
notification. See supra note 14 for specific statutes.
203. SeeTennison & Sjostrom, supra note 191, at Li (noting that Illinois authorities have no
idea who is or is not registered); Bruce Weber, First Arrests in New York Under Sex Offender Law,
480
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offenders who fail to register can be significant."' Because the pen-
alty for non-registration is generally treated as a misdemeanor,2 5 the
incentive for offenders in complying is far outweighed by their fear
of reprisal if notification is enacted.
C. Radical Solutions
In addition to creating a false sense of security, notification statutes
have also led many states to abandon traditional therapies in favor of
more radical treatments. For example, in June of 1997, the Supreme
Court upheld Kansas' Sexual Violent Predator Act.2° The Act con-
tains a civil commitment provision that allows authorities to commit
released sex offenders to secure mental hospitals upon completion of
their prison term. 7 The offender remains confined until a court de-
termines that he poses no further risk.m Although only six other
states have commitment statutes, forty-five states submitted briefs to
the Court supporting civil commitment.2' ° Based on the Court's deci-
sion, similar measures are expected to gain acceptance nationwide. 1
N.Y. TIMEsJuly 6, 1996, at A24 (stating New York attorney general's belief that"it is impossible
to know how many offenders have complied"). As of 1996, three-quarters of sex offenders in
California and nearly half of those in Washington were unregistered. See Ball, supra note 6, at
439.
204. See Miller, supra note 167, at DI (discussing difficulties in getting offenders to register
and reliance of state officials on the public to point out individuals subject to registration).
205. Penalties can range from fines to jail time. SeeTennison & Sjostrom, supra note 191, at
Ll.
206. SeeJoan Biskupic, Court Gives States Leeway in Confining Sex Offenders, WASH. POST, June
24, 1997, at Al. The Kansas Supreme Court had previously ruled the Act unconstitutional on
due process grounds. SeeIn reLeroy Hendricks, 912 P.2d 129 (Kan. 1996), rev'd, 117 S. Ct. 2072
(1997). In his opinion for the court, Justice Clarence Thomas stated "[a]lthough freedom
from physical restraint 'has always been at the core of the liberty protected by the Due Process
clause from arbitrary governmental action' that liberty interest is not absolute." Kansas v. Hen-
dricks, 117 S. Ct. 2072, 2079 (1997) (citation omitted).
207. See Adler & Annin, supra note 186, at 39 (noting that state officials can indefinitely
commit prior sex offenders to mental hospitals under Kansas' sex offender law). Before any
offender is so confined, his case is first reviewed by two panels, ajudge and a psychologist. See
id. at 41. Additionally, he is given a full civil trial in which a twelve person jury must conclude
unanimously that the offender is dangerous. To date,juries have confined only nine of the 618
offenders assessed under the provision; none have been released. See id.
208. See id. Release from confinement is difficult; committed offenders essentially remain
incarcerated until a psychiatric professional will testify to their rehabilitation. In practice, this
requires a "mental-health worker willing to put his career on the line if he's wrong." Id.
209. See Biskupic, supra note 206, at Al. At the time of the Court's decision, Arizona, Cali-
fornia, Minnesota, NewJersey, Washington and Pennsylvania had confinement statutes on rec-
ord. See Adler & Annin, supra note 186, at 41. Many other states were considering similar
measures. SeeBiskupic, supra, at Al.
210. See Biskupic, supra note 206, at Al.
211. Commenting on the ruling, one attorney noted that the confinement law"is going to
spread like wildfire." Biskupic, supra note 206, at Al; see also Editorial, Sexual Predator Laws:
Delicate BalancingJob, PHOENIX GAzEmTE, Dec. 14, 1996, at B6. The Court appeared sympathetic
to civil commitment statutes from the beginning. In response to opening arguments, Chief
Justice William Rehnquist asked, "What is the state supposed to do, just wait until [the of-
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A second, equally controversial proposition concerns treatment of
sexual deviance via surgical212 or chemical213 castration. Such propos-
als have been rejected in the past as too intrusive, dabbling in human
alchemy.24 Yet, despite evidence that castration is ineffective, Cali-
fornia recently adopted a bill requiring weekly hormone injections
for all released sex offenders.1 6 Similarly, a Texas court recently con-
sidered surgical castration for a repeat sexual offender.1 7 Though
Texas officials ultimately rejected the proposal,2 8 public sentiment in
favor of castration may foster adoption of such radical, barbaric
treatments. 9
V. RECOMMENDATIONS
The challenges in dealing with sexual predators are serious. If, as
many believe, sexual deviance cannot be cured through traditional
therapy,22 then the only solution may be in developing measures to
control this behavior. Notification does not meet this challenge. Al-
fender] goes out and does it again?" Id.
212. Surgical castration involves removal of the testes, the organ that produces the male
hormone testosterone. SeeALLGEIER & ALLGEIER, supra note 195, at 697-98.
213. Chemical castration involves utilization of Depo-Provera (medroxyprogesterone ace-
tate), a drug designed to reduce sex drive, and ultimately, unhealthy sexual fantasies. See Rob-
ert E. Freeman-Longo & Ronald V. Wall, Changing a Lifetime of Sexual Crime: Can Sex Offenders
EverAlter Their Ways?, PSYCHOL. TODAY, Mar. 1986, at 58.
214. SeeJudge Withdraws OKfor Rape Suspect's CastrationJET, Mar. 30, 1992, at 18 (describing
Texas judge's repeal of castration sentence after doctors refused to perform the procedure);
L.S. Demsky, The Use of Depo-Provera in the Treatment of Sex Offenders: The Legal Issues, 5/2 J.
LEGAL MED., 1984, at 295-322 (asserting that mandatory use of chemical treatments violates
constitutional ban against cruel and unusual punishment).
215. See William Raspberry, Castration Too Often Not Answer, MONTGOMERYADVERTISER, Apr.
12, 1996, at A10 (noting that up to 85% of surgically castrated offenders reoffend).
216. See Van Biema, supra note 144, at 60. Under the program, even first-time offenders
must submit to weekly injections of depo-provera, a sex-drive reducing hormone. See id. Simi-
lar measures are under consideration in Michigan, Texas, Florida and Massachusetts. Can
States 'Calm Down' Child Molesters?, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Sept. 9, 1996, at 10. Some offend-
ers, however, may require up to a year of treatment before the drug takes effect. See Freeman-
Longo & Wall, supra note 213, at 58. Additionally, depo-provera has many negative side effects,
including infertility. SeeVan Biema, supra, at 60. One critic of the California law complained
that "[i]n effect, the legislators are practicing medicine without a license." Id.
217. See Raspberry, supra note 215, at A10. The case centered around Larry Don McQuay,
an offender who admits to having molested more than 200 children. McQuay asked for the
castration procedure upon his parole, claiming that without it he will likely reoffend. Texas
officials refused to grant the request. See id.
218. See id. McQuay's incarceration resulted from his conviction for molesting a six-year-
old boy. See id.
219. One poll found that 59% of voters support chemical or surgical castration for repeat
offenders. See Many Approve Caning Castration, CAMPAIGNS & ELECrIoNsJune 1994, available in
LEXIS, News Library, Mags File; see also ALLGEIER & ALLGEIER, supra note 195, at 698 (noting
that castration's appeal as a form of treatment is based on the inaccurate premise that male
sexual deviance depends on the presence of testosterone).
220. See Charles Krauthammer, Throw Away the Key, WASH. POST, Dec. 13, 1996, at A23
(asserting that pedophilia is incurable).
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though parents may feel safer knowing of a potential threat, notifica-
tion comes at too high a price in terms of individual freedom. At
worst, the offender may himself become the victim of violent attacks.
At best, he will suffer a punitive level of stigma and ostracism that will
never be erased. The acceptance of registration and notification laws
that suffer from arguable constitutional infirmities has opened the
door to methods that are even more violative of individual rights. A
less radical approach, like the one suggested below, should meet the
same goals of increasing public safety while avoiding the witch-hunt
attributes of current statutes.
A. Maintain Treatment Programs Aimed at Rehabilitation
The ultimate price of notification may be in the abandonment of
traditional treatment programs as a means to control sexual devi-
ance. If sexual deviance is regarded as an incurable disease, then
protection of potential victims addresses only the symptoms, not the
cause. Although an absolute cure may prove impossible, numerous
studies demonstrate a marked reduction in recidivism among treated
offenders.22' Offenders should thus be required to participate in
some form of standardized treatment, the degree of which may be al-
tered according to the crime committed.22 Although such continu-
ous supervision may be expensive, the ultimate payoff-long-term
reduction of sexual offender recidivism-is worth the price.223
B. Implement a Single National Registry
Registration serves a legitimate purpose when employed without
the intrusive stigma associated with notification. Authorities can bet-
ter facilitate an investigation if they have ready access to the addresses
and telephone numbers of released sex offenders. Moreover, most
sex offenders do not object to simple registration. ' The current sys-
221. See HALL, supra note 21, at 141 (noting that treatment can cut recidivism rate to 35%);
Lieberman, supra note 145, at 2 (comparing 8A% recidivism rate for treated offenders with an
18.5% rate for non-treated offenders); Freeman-Longo & Wall, supra note 213, at 58 (treatment
results in a 55-70% reduction in recidivism rates). Despite such statistics, public perception
that treatment is ineffective still persists. See HALL, supra, at 141 (stating that "even a single
highly publicized reoffense of a person who has participated in treatment may outweigh strong
evidence of treatment effectiveness").
222. For example, a pedophile with a history of attacks on children would require longer
and more intense therapy than a one time offender convicted of date rape.
223. Creative solutions can be employed to offset the cost. One possible suggestion is to
waive educational loan payments from psychologists and therapists in exchange for free treat-
ment of sex offenders. In addition to helping current offenders, such a system could also pro-
vide research needed for development of more effective treatments for sexual abuse and ag-
gression.
224. See Miller, supra note 167, at D1 (finding that many sex offenders do not object to reg-
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tem in which the processes and methods of registration vary from
state to state, however, is clearly inefficient.2 A national registry, an
idea already gaining wide acceptance, u  could offer more than just
the tracking of offenders from state to state. Adoption of uniform
registration standards could eliminate the confusion that officials and
offenders presently face. For example, those subject to registration
would know the nature and length of the requirement, as well as the
proper procedures for compliance. The non-punitive nature of reg-
istration would allow retroactive application, without dilution of con-
stitutional rights. To succeed, however, any system must employ in-
novative measures to track offenders who fail to comply. For
example, offenders could be "locked out" from certain activities for
avoiding registration, such as obtaining a driver's license or receiving
tax returns unless they are registered. Using such administrative
functions as a net to catch unregistered offenders would also reduce
the burden on police in enforcing these laws.2s2 Additionally, al-
though it is unrealistic to expect complete acquiescence to registra-
tion, stiffer penalties might improve the likelihood that offenders will
comply. For instance, treating failure to register as a felony, with a
mandatory sentence of one year in jail, would encourage compliance
with a national registration law. Unlike current notification statutes,
the risk of penalty would not outweigh the risk of conformity.
CONCLUSION
The sexual violation of children strikes a deep emotional chord
within all of us. Every tragedy such as the murder of Megan Kanka
confirms the horrific and inhuman nature of these crimes. Our out-
rage, however great, should not be channeled into ineffective solu-
tions. No matter how they are justified, notification laws are inher-
ently punitive. The stigmatizing effect of public disclosure does more
istration laws that place law enforcement officials on alert). Many offenders, however,'bristle
at the notion that the public will know." Id.
225. See supra Part I.B (reviewing varying approaches and statutes for registration and noti-
fication of sex offenders).
226. See supra note 168 and accompanying text (discussing political appeal of a national
registry).
227. See Gottieib, supra note 22, at AS (stating that Connecticut officials are confused on
how to apply notification); Lombardi, supra note 36, at WC13 (reporting that New York police
.are in a quandary" as to who should be notified); see also State v. Zichko, 923 P.2d 966, 973-76
(Idaho 1996) (Johnson, J., dissenting) (describing how vague wording of Idaho statute creates
confusion for offenders).
228. It could also reduce the damage in the event of an error. For example, it is possible
that an individual sharing the same name as a released offender might inadvertently be in-
cluded on the list. With a national system, he can correct the problem in a single instance. By
contrast, in the current system, such an error could follow an innocent party from state to state.
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than burden offenders; it puts the public at greater risk by making
rehabilitation of the offender virtually impossible. A solution built
on logic rather than emotion is required before sexual deviance can
finally be controlled.

